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Director: J. M. Jamil Erownson
Indonesia faces problems in the financial relationship bet­
ween its central and regional governments . The prcblem:s today 
in Indonesia are multitude: first, there is a lack of a clear 
functional division of responsibilities between the central 
and regional government. Second, there is a relatively high 
degree of centralization in government. And, third, there is 
a desire for national political stability. These all culmi­
nate in a strong central government capable of exercising 
effective authority throughout the country, and controlling 
taxation and the total expenditures of the local governments. 
Consequently, regional governments are highly dependent on 
central grants and subsidies.
This paper examines this issue by focusing on the role of 
the Provincial Subsidy Scheme in regional development activ­
ities, which contains features crucial to both the regional 
and central governments.
The program is funded by the central government but admin­
istered by the provincial governments. It makes up about 65 
per cent of the development revenues of the provincial 
governments, and is mainly devoted to helping the provincial 
governments to regional development. However, in the name of 
national interest and in order to be able to discharge its 
responsibilities for managing the economy effectively, the 
central government imposes directions and prohibitions to the 
local governments. The purpose is to ensure that aggregate 
local government spending is compatible with national 
economic objectives.
The program also serves as a path through which the central 
government delegates some of its authority to lower levels of 
government. The purpose is to share burdens in providing 
services to the people and intraining local staff to manage 
development projects in an efficient manner.
The devolution of power is not meant to consolidate the 
political bargaining position of the local governments vis-a- 
vis the central authority. Rather, local governments are to 
carry forward development in accordance with regulations 
previously determined by the central government. Not sur­
prisingly, local governments have little latitude to rein­
terpret central plans and priorities.
This paper is to explain the role of the Provincial Subsidy 
Scheme in regional development in Indonesia. It does not 
claim to provide a thorough analysis of the program, but has 
two modest purposes: to summarize the rationale, objectives 
and the administrative procedures of administering the 
program, and, consequently, to provide or pertinent questions 
for further exploration.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Problem of Decentralization in Developing Mations
As a consequence of a number of influences, including 
pre-colonial forms of government often reinforced by colonial 
regimes experienced before independence, most developing 
nations have generally regarded unified, centralized and 
regulatory government as highly desirable.
Centralization has tended to be both the norm and the ideal 
that pervades the concepts or political, economic and 
administrative organization.^
This tendency was often reinforced by the intention to 
insure rapid industrial growth through intensification of 
capital formation as ingredients of alleviating poverty and 
generating income and savings. To attain these objectives, 
central planning was prescribed as an absolute requirement for 
development.^
By the 1960s, however, it was widely recognized that
^Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis, and G. Shabir 
Cheema, "Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of 
Recent Experience", The World Bank Staff Working Paper,
No. 581. (Washington D.C.: 1984), p. 1.
^Heraldo Munoz, "The Various Roads to Development," 
in Heraldo Munoz (ed.) From Dependency to Development : 
Strategies to overcome Underdevelopment and Inegualitv. 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 2-9.
1
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central planning had not achieved these goals. Though 
growth rates were high, economic growth remained sluggish. 
Often, relatively small groups benefited from increased 
national production, while income disparities between the rich 
and the poor, as well as among regions, widened in many 
developing nations. The phenomena that resulted were economic 
instability, social unrest, and political disorder, often 
culminating in civil disturbances and local insurrections.
Confronted by these facts, many governments of the Third 
World, particularly during the 1970s, began questioning the 
effectiveness of the strategy of central planning, and tried 
reversing directions. Beginning with this critical period, 
they began to experiment not only with new approaches to 
development, but also with new political and administrative 
arrangements for planning and governing development programs. 
The increasing interest in decentralizing authority for 
planning and administration to regional and local units arose 
from three converging forces: first, from disillusionment with 
the result of the central planning and control of development 
activities during the 50s and 60s; second, from the implicit 
requirements for new ways of managing development programs 
that were embodied in growth-with-equity strategies that 
emerged during the 70s; and third, from the growing 
realization that it becomes increasingly difficult to plan and 
to administer all
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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development activities efficiently and effectively solely 
from the center.^
Nevertheless, the realization of the need for 
decentralization does not automatically guarantee that the 
Western experience relating to this issue could be easily 
transferred to these countries. Because of fundamental 
differences in political structure and legal traditions, as 
well as socioeconomic differences between the old established 
countries of the West and the newly emerging nations, and in 
addition to the political attitudes of the leaders of the 
latter toward decentralization itself, the concept has been 
used tacitly, sometimes extremely loosely, to permit many 
different kinds of institutional arrangements to be presented 
in its name. Indeed, this variety underlines the political 
importance attached to decentralization in developing 
countries. On the one hand, the central authority insists 
that the local unit be autonomous, but on the other hand, it 
treats the local government as the extension of its authority 
reaching right down to each locality.'*
^Dennis A. Rondinelli and G. Shabir Cheema, 
"Implementing Decentralization Policies: An Introduction," 
in Dennis A. Rondinelli and G. Shabir Cheema (eds.) 
Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in 
Developing Countries. (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage
Publication, 1983), p. 10.
'*Harry J. Friedman, "Decentralized Development in 
Asia: Local Political Alternatives," in Dennis A. Rondinelli 
and G. Shabir Cheema, Ibid, p. 35.
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One of the difficulties derives from the traditions and 
patterns of decentralization in the West: In some Western
countries, decentralization refers to the territorial 
distribution of power and authority. It is concerned with the 
extent to which functions are dispersed throughout the 
geographical hierarchy of the state, and the institutions and 
processes through which such dispersal occurs. In addition, 
it also entails the subdivision of the state's territory into 
smaller areas and the creation of political and administrative 
institutions in those areas.^
Furthermore, in Western parlance, the granting of power to 
subordinate units of government implies the use of 
constitutional structure and legislative guarantees in order 
to protect those powers. Authorities so granted cannot 
arbitrarily be withdrawn, while the national administration is 
generally denied the right to intervene within these realms 
reserved for the lower level of government. Therefore, 
smaller areas below the national level became autonomous local 
units, which have the full right to manage their own affairs. 
From the Western point of view, the great strength of local 
autonomous units should be that they promote efficiency, by 
providing services that better fit local conditions and
.C . Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial 
Dimension of the State. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1985), p. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
circumstances than can ever be achieved by more distant 
decision makers.’
1.2. Decentralization Efforts in Indonesia
It is not possible in a brief paper such as this to 
review the general experience with the decentralization 
efforts in the developing world. Only a single example will 
be covered, that of Indonesia, and even here only in a brief 
review. Since its inception as an independent republic in 
1945, the government of Indonesia has been tried to become 
more democratic delegating some of its authority to local 
levels. Initially decentralization in Indonesia was merely 
seen as a continuation of the Dutch concept of federalism, 
which had been interpreted by the revolutionaries as a 
mechanism for the perpetuation of colonialism,^ Many argue 
that decentralization could help the government by securing 
public compliance and stabilyzing the political order. 
Moreover, regional diversity, the archipelagic nature of the 
country, as well as the desire to deliver governmental 
services to the people in a more efficient fashion, have 
provided other reasons for decentralization. More
importantly, can increase political stability and national
^George Jones and John Steward, The Case for Local 
Government. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 6.
^Millidge Walker, Decentralization in a Guided 
Democracy: The Future of Local Government in Indonesia, 
Paper read at meeting of the Association for Asian Studies 
(New York : April 13, 1960), p. 5.
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unity by accommodating regional differences theoretically 
through broader participation in the decision making 
processes .
However, while decentralization became an article of 
faith and was widely accepted as a highly desirable policy to 
be launched in pursuing national objectives, there was no 
common understanding or agreement as to its real meaning and 
the best way of achieving it . Such uncertainty is not 
unusual. Diana Conyers, for instance, in a general study of 
decentralization as the latest fashion in development 
administration concludes that during the drafting of 
constitutions prior to independence, there has often been a 
wide spread debate regarding decentralization. The
discussions relating to this topic were intensified by 
considerable disagreement about the degree of decentralization 
and the form which should take.® Therefore, it is not 
surprising that decisions regarding the degree of control that 
the central government could and should have over regional 
affairs, and the room that should be provided for local 
initiatives within the overall
governmental process, have always been a subject of 
controversy.
For Maryanov, the tension between the center and the
®Diana Conyers, "Decentralization: The Latest Fashion 
in Development Administration," in Public Administration and 
Development. Vol. 3. {New York : John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 
p. 99 .
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local authorities relating to decentralization in Indonesia 
stemmed from two different views. First, there were groups 
who insisted that a "top-down" approach in terms of government 
organization and the needs for leadership be 
institutionalized. On the opposite side, other groups 
strongly required that a "bottom-up" mechanism in terms of 
popular demands and regional agitation be legitimized and 
practiced. For the former the problem was decentralization, 
while for the latter it was regional autonomy.®
From an economic perspective, people from deficit 
regions in Indonesia have persistently supported 
centralization and redistribution from the center, because of 
difficulties in raising revenues locally. The reason has been 
to obtain central grants and subsidies to cover their 
expenditure. On the contrary, people from more prosperous 
surplus regions have preferred regional autonomy and local 
government rule. This is because they want to keep their 
surplus revenue within their own regions and to decide how to 
spend them without being dependent upon central support.
The initial solution of these conflicting demands was set 
up by enacting the first local government law in 1948. 
Worried by problems of destabilizing into a weak federalism 
and the need to consolidate the nation, the government then
®Gerald S . Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as 
a Political Problem, Interim Reports Series, Modern 
Indonesia Project. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1958), p. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
set to favor centralization rather than regional autonomy. 
This decision was taken not without good cause. John Legge, 
who studied the problem of central-local relations in 
Indonesia during the first years of independence, found that 
distribution of power would have weakened the bargaining 
position of the center in leading the country. Therefore, he 
concluded, that though the law was designed to be the basis of 
establishing subnational autonomous units in the year to come, 
and to lay the pattern foe eventual regional development, 
central supervision and control still prevailed.
Nevertheless, the central government apparently did not 
intend to perpetuate that system. During the succeeding 
years, the centralized nature of the law was gradually 
modified by transforming three of the levels of the regional 
hierarchy into self-governing local units. Unfortunately, the 
Dutch police action and the capture of the republican capital 
hindered the process. Further, the problem the central 
government was facing was aggravated by the fall of several 
cabinets within a very short period of time. These events 
indicated how weak the central government was in coping with 
the issue of delegation.
John D. Legge, Problem of Regional Autonomy in 
Contemporary Indonesia. Interim Report Series. Modern 
Indonesia Project. (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University 
Press, 1957) pp. 2-6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In order to keep the tension from becoming more 
explosive, in 1957 the government ratified the second local 
government law. Having learned from past experience, an 
emphasis upon real autonomy and the delegation of power as 
widely as possible was introduced. Real autonomous and 
delegation of power are the main ingredient in the 
decentralization. Since 1957, local governmients have been 
able to act with some autonomous on a whole range of matters 
which the central administration had not previously treated. 
However, once again the tendency of the center to sustain its 
dominant role over regional affairs made the tensions between 
the center and the local authorities steadily worsen. They 
reached their peak in 1965.
With the new order government after 1965, the system of 
local government and central-local government relationships 
were dramatically restructured; the primary concern was the 
establishment of a strong national leadership supported by a 
centralized political order and bureaucracy. It was decided 
that regional development should go hand in hand with the 
maintenance of central sovereignty. Under these
circumstances, the decentralization program has been seen 
not merely as a right of local units to be independent from 
the center and to run the regional administrations 
democratically. Rather, it was seen more as their obligation 
to participate in carrying forward development as a means to 
achieve the prosperity of the people. As such, authorities
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and powers delegated by the center can, at any time, be 
withdrawn, while the local units can be abolished by national 
law.’̂ A common theme underlying this policy centers on the 
importance of building institutional capability, particularly 
the capacity of local agencies to manage both their own 
affairs and powers granted to them by the center. This basic 
guidance then materialized into the new local government law, 
ratified in 1974.
Under the current act, decentralization gets a new 
meaning. The source of local income was restructured, and 
more than 60 percent comes from the center. More importantly, 
the central government then took over the responsibility of 
the local governments to pay their staffs' salaries by 
granting annual funding known as Autonomous Regions Subsidy 
(SDO - Subsidi Daerah Otonom) . In addition, the pattern of 
local expenditure also has been improved, in the sense that 
funding should be allocated more to the economic-productive 
sector. To assure that the program would be undertaken as 
planned, the central government introduced a package of 
regional development programs, funded by the center but 
administered by the local agencies. One of them is Provincial 
Subsidy Scheme.
In implementing this program, the room for local 
judgement is quite limited, since at all times, the authority
'' Department of Interior, Law No. 5 of 1974, Article
14 .
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of the national government remains supreme. Regions have 
only the right to organize and to manage the program in 
accordance with prevailing regulations determined by the 
center. After eighteen years in operation, this program
is still administered in the same way. There is still not any 
delegation on real power to regional governments.
The present study was carried out to gain insights into 
this Provincial Subsidy Scheme by looking in detail at three 
main issues: first, its role in fostering regional development 
activities; second, the responsibility of both the central 
agency and the office of governor in its implementation; and, 
finally, in assessing the increased ability of local agencies 
to manage development projects within the scheme as well as to 
highlight obstacles faurs the government. This study also 
suggests some alternatives to improving management skills and 
implementation of the program.
Michael Morfit, "Strengthening the Capabilities of 
Local Government Policies and Constraints," in Collin 
MacAndrews (ed.) Central Government and Local Development 
in Indonesia. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
p.57 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1.3. The Problem of Decentralization
Strengthening the capabilities of local government 
agencies has always been a reasonable objective to be pursued 
by any democratic regime. This could be achieved in a number 
of ways.
In Indonesia, a number of major regional development 
programs designed for implementation at the local level have 
been put into operation during the last several years. These 
programs have keen identified as a potential focus for project 
support with reference to the government strategy of launching 
projects which promote development benefits for the local 
people, as well as fostering increased involvement of this 
sector of the populace in the overall development process.
At present, there are eight major programs, launched 
under the Presidential Decree Program, which in order of 
inception, include the following:
1. Inpres Desa - Village Subsidy Scheme (1969/70);
2. Inpres Kabupaten - Regency Subsidy Scheme (1970/71);
3. Inpres S.D. - Primary School Subsidy Scheme (1973/74);
4. Inpres Kesehatan - Community Health Scheme (1974/75);
5. Inpres Propinsi - Provincial Subsidy Scheme (1974/75);
6. Inpres Penghijauan - Reforestation Subsidy Scheme
(1976/77);
7. Inpres Pasar - Market Building Subsidy Scheme
(1976/77);
8. Inpres Penunjangan Jalan - Local Road Betterment
Subsidy Scheme (1979/80) .
” See R.A. Richards, "The Kabupaten Program and 
Administrative Reform," in INDONESIA. (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornel University Press, 1978), No. 25, April, p. 103.
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In total, some R p . 1,10 6,000,000,000 are included in the 
1988/1989 budget for these special regional and district 
development program out of a total development budget of R p . 
8, 897, 600, 000, 000, or 12.4%.^'’ In the previous fiscal year, 
the amount was only R p . 921,200,000,000, or 11.9%, out of the 
R p . 7, 756, 600, 000, 000 total development budget.
In the fiscal year of 1983/84, final year for which this 
study has data, the funding disbursed for these programs was 
even higher, about R p . 1, 476, 118, 300, 000 out of R p .
9,290, 000, 000, 000 (15%) . The decrease since then is due not 
to decreases in total government revenue. Instead, it 
reflects an increase in recurrent expenditures that need to 
be covered, so that funding that could be disbursed for 
development activities should be reduced.
In terms of the amount of funding which has been 
allocated to each scheme from the inception of the programs 
until 1983/1984, the Primary School Building Scheme received 
the largest allocation, which accounted for R p . 
2,263,645,490,000. This was followed by the Provincial 
Subsidy Scheme with R p . 1, 307, 173, 450, 000, and the Regency
Subsidy Scheme with R p . 1,110,866,202,000. The breakdown is 
provided in Table 1.1.
As is apparent from their names, all of these schemes, 
except for the Provincial Subsidy Scheme, are devoted to 
carefully determined areas or projects, e.g., health.
14 Harian Umum KOMPAS, January 6, 1988.
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education, agriculture. Hence, the scope for local judgment 
and initiative is very limited. The determination of broad 
policies and the right to allocate funding for each project 
are commonly the prerogative of the central agencies.
Table 1.1
Allocation of Inpres Funds Among Different Programs,
1969/1970 - 1983/1984
A
Programs
1 1 o c a t i 
(Thousand Rupiahs) %
o n
of Total INPRES
Village Subsidy 452,736,000 7 . 0
Regency Subsidy 1,110,866,202 17 . 3
Primary School Subsidy 2,263,645,490 34 .8
Health Subsidy 450,490,334 6.5
Provincial Subsidy 1,307,173,450 20.2
Market Subsidy 305,000,000 3 . 9
Reforestation Subsidy 410,568,000 6.3
Road Betterment Subsidy 261,996,500 4 . 0
Total 6,563,088,584 100 . 0
Source: Department of Interior, Directorate General of 
Regional Development, The Role and the Function the 
Directorate General of Regional Development in 
Conducting Regional Development Programs.
{Jakarta: 1983), pp. 48-59.
Some aspects of the Provincial Subsidy Scheme, however, 
deserve special attention. First, funding for this scheme is 
directly transferred from the central budget and is intended 
to be the basic development revenue for each province. The 
funding then is divided into two kinds:
See Michael Morfit, "Strengthening the 
Capabilities of Local Government in Indonesia: Issues, 
Strategies, and Experiences, "Journal of Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, V o l . 6, N o . 1 . (Singapore, 1984), p . 61.
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decided fund (dana yang ditetapkan) and guided fund (dana 
yang diarahkan) . The utilization of decided fund is usually 
the prerogative of the center. It has to be used to finance 
three important subsectors: roads; irrigation dams; and
bridges. As with the other programs, the scope for local 
judgement in conducting programs covered under decided fund is 
almost non-existent.
On the other hand, the right to utilize guided fund 
almost completely devolves to the local institutions. In this 
respect, the central agency sets only a general guidance to be 
followed, which can be adjusted to meet the special conditions 
of each locality. Sectors to which this funding can be 
allocated is decided by the local government guided by the 
Provincial Planning Board.
In addition to this, each provincial government also has 
its own income sources derived from some basic activities. 
Taxes on land, commodities, vehicles, changing ownership of 
vehicles, licence fees as well as revenues from government and 
privately owned enterprises are the most important sources. 
Furthermore, both income granted by the center through the 
Provincial Subsidy Scheme and genuine local revenues must be 
combined together into the Annual Provincial Revenue and 
Expenditure Plan. Generally, although the center imposes some 
regulations upon local budgets, to a great extent, they are 
not enforced on the local revenue budget. This means that 
projects and purchases that are prohibited for funding through
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the Provincial Subsidy Scheme, such as luxurious official cars 
and building new office complexes can be covered by the local 
budget. However, a report issued by the Ministry of Interior 
shows that only four out of twenty seven provinces have local 
revenues that exceed funds granted by the center.*' 
Therefore, the opportunity of almost all of provinces to 
initiate projects on their own is very limited, while the 
dependency upon the central subsidy is extremely high.
To undertake projects, the local government must first, 
develop annual project proposals to be undertaken in the next 
fiscal year, and obtain approval of the proposals by the 
center, Ministry of Interior, Directorate General Regional 
Development. The approval is needed to insure that the 
standard guidance set by the center has been met. Here again, 
the distribution of funding for each sector needs to be in 
accordance with the national planning.
In the next stage, all of these projects must be put 
together into Provincial Annual Plans, and can only be 
implemented so far as they have been approved by the Minister 
of Interior. More importantly, all projects above 
R p . 200, 000, 000 ($120, 000.00), after being tendered by the
local government to any private firm or contractor, must be 
authorized by the central agency.
See Department of Interior, Report on the Conduct 
of Provincial Development Programs, op.cit., pp. 17-19.
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Many certain problems such as the delay of projects and 
the inability of local governments to absorb this delegated 
funding have experienced by all provinces. The Annual Report 
produced by the Directorate General of Regional Development 
shows that during the Second Five Year Plan (1974/75 until 
1978/79), as much as 23.81 percent of the total funds that 
could not be expended by the local governments. These
residual funds were even higher during the Third Five Year
Plan (1979/80-1983/84): 38.41 percent. The breakdown is
provided in Table 1.2.
Furthermore, the report maintains that the source of 
these problems have always been both the central and the 
regional governments. The lack of expertise, of heavy 
equipment, as well as bonafide local contractors in some
provinces are honestly recognized. On the other hand, the
weakness of coordination which is still a problem until 
recently, is attributed to the center.
In addition, central approval over all local planning and 
project implementation, apparently, is one of the most 
critical source of delay.
Based on government regulations, the local government 
fiscal year coincides with the national fiscal year and starts 
on April 1 and ends on March 31. However, the report shows 
that the Provincial fiscal year has always started on June, 
since the central approval has always been received by that 
time .
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Table 1.2
The Percentage of Budget
(1974/75
Absorption and 
- 1983/84)
Residual
No . Fiscal Year Absorption Residual Period
1 . 1974/75 81 % 19 %
2 . 1975/76 82 % 18 %
3 . 1976/77 79 % 21 % PELITA II
4 . 1977/78 74 % 26 %
5 . 1978/79 66 % 34 %
6 . 1979/80 63 % 37 %
7 . 1980/81 63 % 37 %
8 . 1981/82 65 % 35 % PELITA III
9 . 1982/83 65 % 35 %
10 . 1983/84 53 % 47 %
11 . 1984/85 53 % 47 %
12 . 1985/86 71 % 29 % PELITA IV
Source: Department of Interior, Report on the Conduct of
Provi ncial Development Programs, op.cit., p. 12.
In short, the problems sketched above raise the question 
of how is it possible for the central government to 
decentralize some of its authority and resources to lower 
level governments without retaining any strict measure of 
control over their use.
1.4. Methodolocrv
This study basically reviews the Provincial Subsidy 
Scheme since its inception in 1974/75 up to 1983/84. The data 
upon which the analysis is based derives primarily from 
secondary sources. Of particular importance are reports 
issued by the Indonesian Government, and research
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undertaken by individuals and organizations. The emphasis is 
chiefly on the role of the Provincial Subsidy Scheme 
(Inpres Propinsi) on the process of regional development; the 
latitude provided by the center for local judgement; the scope 
of central supervision and control; and the benefits to the 
local administrative and technical staffs from having 
participated in the overall process.
Data regarding local funds, central subsidies, 
regulations imposed by the center, and job descriptions of 
both central and local institutions, are the basic source 
material.
1.5. Organization of the Paper
The study is divided into five chapters. Following the 
historical background of the ratification of local Government 
Law N o . 5 of 1974 presented above, the second and third 
chapters deal with the structural system of local government 
and process and policy of carrying out the Provincial Subsidy 
Scheme.
More specifically. Chapter 2 presents the system of local 
government under the current act, by examining the 
administrative structure, in terms of regional units and the 
nature of local autonomy as well as the concept of 
decentralization currently implemented in Indonesia. The 
position of the Governor, who has a dual functions, i.e., as 
the elected head executive of local government, and as the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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representative of the central interest in the region, 
including the role of local legislature, will be elaborated. 
The regional budgeting and planning procedure is discussed at 
the end of this chapter.
The central focus of the paper is presented in Chapter 3. 
Here, the role of the Provincial Subsidy Scheme as the largest 
source of local development revenue, and its rationale and 
objectives are thoroughly discussed.
To provide a better understanding of the program as an 
initial stage of strengthening local institutional 
capabilities, the administrative procedure of allocating 
funding and of developing plans to be submitted to the central 
authority will be emphasized. The subsequent discussion 
regarding the scope of central supervision and the latitude 
for local initiatives will add to the understanding of the 
program. Community participation, as one of the most crucial 
objectives, will also be described.
Chapter 4 addresses finding ways of improving the 
implementation of the program. Because of the initial 
objectives, the shift toward a more decentralized process is 
assumed as the most desirable policy to be accomplished. 
Inevitably, the reduction of central intervention and 
strengthening the bargaining position of the local government 
within the program cannot be avoided.
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Finally, conclusions are presented in chapter 5, along 
with some policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE LAW NO. 5 OF 1974
2.1. Introduction
After 1965 the military establishment started to govern 
the country in a completely different pattern from that of the 
administration it replaced. As a new regime taking over after 
decades of turmoil, there were four immediate challenges that 
the government had to face. The first one was the need to 
establish control and authority of the center throughout all 
parts of the country; the second was the need to restore 
economic stability and to prepare the basis for economic 
development; the third was the need to legitimize its 
sovereignty as a regime; and the fourth was the need to secure 
public compliance.*^ The new ruling elite came into power 
and was immediately confronted with accomplishing these four 
massive tasks. It is therefore hardly surprising that this 
government needed nearly a decade before it could handle all 
the challenges it faced.
However, after twenty years of leading the country, there 
are some fascinating aspects of change which epitomize the 
regime's achievements. Among other things, political
Collin MacAndrews, "The Structure of Government In 
Indonesia," in Collin MacAndrews (ed.) Central Government 
and Local Development in Indonesia, op.cit., pp. 27-31.
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Stability, economic growth, and the final recognition of the 
central authority throughout the archipelago stand as the 
hallmarks. These accomplishments could only be achieved by 
introducing strict austerity measures, in term of 
dépolitisation of political activity, rationalization of 
bureaucracy, and restructuralization of central-local 
government relationships.
The implementation of such measures was highly influenced 
by the political approach which assumed that the economic 
development of a non - indust rialy zed nation can only be 
accelerated so long as the central government is strong enough 
to maintain stability and order as well as manipulate the 
political process. In addition, development is no longer seen 
merely as a set of ends. Rather it is seen almost exclusively 
as a process.
The period from 1955 to 1974 saw the strict 
implementation of such a model. The authority of the central 
government in deciding all crucial policies was dramatically 
strengthened, while the participation of regional government 
within the process was greatly reduced. It was not until 1974 
that the government started to restructure the political and 
administrative framework for central-provincial government 
relationships.
The central governments policy with regard to the 
development of such relationships was articulated primarily in 
Basic Law n o . 5 of 1974. This act constitutes the legal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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framework for all subsequent programs and policies affecting 
the development of local government in Indonesia, and it is 
the basic reference point to any study of the experience of 
local government under the new regime. This law has
brought about a fundamental change in the regional authority 
and its position vis-a-vis the central administration. It is 
the intention of this chapter to examine briefly the local 
government structure under the current law. This explanation 
will provide a basis for understanding the nature of regional 
development programs currently undertaken in Indonesia.
2.2. Administrative Structure
The current structure of government in Indonesia was
first broadly outline in the 1945 Constitution, and has been 
amended at later stages through additional legislation. The
influence of the Dutch colonial administration which evolved
over some 350 years, as well as the ecological and cultural 
differences among the people have persistently influenced 
the form and the structure of government at various times. 
Since independence in 1945, MacAndrews sees that one of the 
most crucial factors that has continuously influenced the type 
and the shape of government has been the dynamics of the 
relationship between the central government, based on Java,
Michael Morfit, op. cit., p. 59
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and the much larger areas of the outer islands.*®
The balance of power and the scope of political influence that 
the center can and should have over regional affairs have been 
of particular significance.
The central government consists of six principal organs:
(1) People's Consultative Assembly (MPR); (2) President;
(3) House of Representatives (DPR); (4) Supreme Advisory 
Council (DPA); (5) Supreme Audit Board (BPK) ; and (6)
Supreme Court (MA).
Technically, the MPR holds supreme power in the state, 
and adopts the constitution and sets policy guidelines for the 
state. Its other main tasks are to elect the President and 
the Vice-President. The MPR consists of 1,000 members, one-
half of which are elected members of the House of
Representative (DPR), and the other half are appointed by the 
President representing various social, political, and 
functional groups. The entire assembly must meet at least 
once every five years.
The House of Representatives is the legislative body of 
the state. It consists of 500 members, 400 of which are 
elected members by the three major political parties 
recognized in the system, while the remaining 100 are
appointed by the government to represent both military and 
non-military groups. Members of the House hold office for a 
fixed term of five years, meeting in sessions which run
19 See Collin MacAndrews, op. cit., p. 2.
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throughout the year.
The key figure within the government is the President. 
Although responsible to the MPR, he is effectively the chief 
executive of the government, as well as head of the state. 
He holds office for a term of five years, and is eligible for 
reelect ion. In his capacity as head of the state, he has 
command over the armed forces, appoints ministers and 
governors, and promulgates laws. However, both in the 
ratification of laws and in the budgetary process, he must 
consult with the House of Representatives (DPR).
In conducting the administration, the President is also 
advised by the Supreme Advisory Council, a group of twenty 
seven senior people appointed by the President himself. The 
council can rule on issues raised by the President and has the 
right to submit proposals to the government. Representing all 
elements of the socioeconomic spectrum, the council 
effectively acts as the President's private brain trust.
In practice, the real government of Indonesia is the 
cabinet, headed by the President. Currently there are twenty 
one ministers in charge of departments: three coordinator
ministers; eight state ministers without portfolios and six 
junior ministers.
Department of Public Works, Institutional 
Framework With Special Reference to East Indonesia. 
(Jakarta: 1974), p.4
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
In conjunction with national development planning, the 
President is also assisted by the National Planning Board, 
which is linked directly to the office of the President.
Its main responsibilities are (1) to devise long and short 
term development plans; (2) to coordinate national and 
regional development programs; (3) together with the Ministry 
of Treasury, to forcast national income and expenditure 
patterns; and (4) to set policies concerning investment as 
well as foreign aid.
In addition, the central government is also functions 
through a number of important agencies or boards in different 
fields, that, in most cases, report directly to the President. 
They include the Civil Service Administration Board; the 
Central Bureau of Statistics; the Institute of Science; the 
National Family Planning Coordination; the State Legistic 
Agency; and the Agency for Assessment and Application of 
Technology. Figure 2.1. summarizes the structure of the
Indonesian central government.
At the local level, a quite similar structure of 
administration has been put into operation. Some institutions 
are intrinsic parts of the local government structure, while 
others are units of central agencies stationed in the regions. 
The local governments are equipped by central grants and 
subsidies, and have a right to manage their own affairs.
21 See Collin MacAndrews, op.cit., p. 23-25
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Figure 2.1. The Structure of Indonesian Central Government. 
Source: Collin MacAndrews, op.cit., p. 12.
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However, in keeping with the unitary character of the 
state, the creation of local government in Indonesia takes the 
form of an authorization, that is a delegation of authority on 
the part of the center. This brings an implication that 
residual powers always remain with the central government.
Local government Law No. 5 of 1974 states that delegation 
of central authority will be undertaken by three basic 
processes: decentralization, déconcentration, and cooperation. 
The central department which is in charge of coordinating the 
process of local government is the Department of Interior. 
The adoption of these three principles has affected the 
structure of local government in Indonesia, as well as its 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the central administration and 
the way it conducts its functions.
2.3. Regional Units and Local Autonomy
Indonesia is a unitary state which consists of a strong 
central government with four additional tiers of government:
(1) provinces; (2) districts (consists of two kinds of local 
units, i.e., regency and municipality); (3) sub-districts; and
(4) villages.
The first three tiers are established by national laws, 
which stipulate: (1) administrative and physical boundaries;
(2) all matters relating to home rule of the local government 
concerned; (3) the necessary service offices and their related 
budget; and (4) sources of revenues and patterns of the
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expenditures. The fourth tier is established by provincial 
government law. The legislation on local government also 
specifies what central government functions can be delegated 
to the local levels, including provision for the necessary 
equipment and needed sources of income.
The constitutional basis for regionalizing the country is 
found in Chapter 18 of the 1945 Constitution, which has since 
been modified at later stages through operational legislation.
The regionalization is carried out both physically, which 
is conducted to fulfill the intention of the decentralization 
program, and administratively, which is undertaken to fulfill 
the intention of déconcentration. The former produces daerah 
otonom, a generic term meaning local self-government, while 
the latter produces wilayah administrât if or administrative 
area, that is a territorial hierarchy or division of the 
central offices in the region.
Currently, administrative areas exist at three levels,
i.e., province, district (regency or municipality), and 
suddistrict. These three levels of administrative areas were 
established to be the headquarters of branch offices of 
central departments or vertical institutions which have 
authority to undertake, not to decide, deconcentrated 
policies, programs and projects previously determined by the 
central authority. Briefly stated, the vertical institutions 
stand only as the representative of the central authority 
stationed in the regions, and are not entitled to a right to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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manage their own affairs. Each vertical agency is led by a 
centrally appointed leader called as Kepala Kantor wilavah. 
and reports directly to the relevant central government 
department. Programs they are undertake are known as sectoral 
development programs, and the funding for these programs is 
directly derived from the national budget.
At the provincial level, the leadership of administrative 
areas is assumed by the Governor. At the district level, it 
is entrusted to the Bupati (in the case of regency) and to the 
Walikotamadya (in the case of municipality), and to the Camat 
at the subdistrict level. All of these leaders operate as the 
representative of the central authority in their regions, and 
report to the center hierarchically.
Further, as another element of the decentralization 
principle, there exist daerah otonom (autonomous regions) in 
the country. Currently, autonomous regions consist of two 
levels, i.e., Daerah Otonom Tingkat I and Daerah Otonom 
Tingkat II (first and second level of autonomous region).
In detail, daerah otonom is supposed to be an entity to 
which the central government decentralizes some of its 
authority to be fully undertaken by the government of this 
region. Hence, this entity is granted local autonomy, meaning 
a right to manage its own affairs. Accordingly, it is 
equipped with its own source of income.
The leadership of these regions is assumed by the Kepala 
Daerah Tingkat I (chief executive of the first level of local
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government) , and Kepala Daerah Tincrkat II (chief executive of 
the second level of local government). Both leaders are 
elected by the respective local representative councils from 
lists of two to five candidates nominated by factions in the 
councils, and authorized by the President. The prime task of 
the Kepala Daerah is to administer the government and to 
provide services in accordance with the aspirations and needs 
of the local people concerned. As such, he should consult and 
work hand in hand with the local representative council.
On a day to day basis, the Kepala Daerah is assisted by 
an Executive Secretariat consisting of one Executive Secretary 
and several assistants, and served by various local technical 
agencies. Programs they undertake are called decentralization 
development programs, and funding for the programs is derived 
directly from the genuine local budget.
For efficient administration and better coordination, 
this physical boundaries of an autonomous region and an 
administrative area coincide, and the leadership of the two 
entities are combined in the same person.
Therefore, the first level of local autonomous unit 
(Daerah Otonom Tingkat I) is unified with the first level of 
administrative area (Province), and its name becomes Propinsi 
Daerah Otonom Tingkat I . The same provisions are also imposed 
at the second level of local government.
At the provincial level, the governing of this unified 
entity is assumed by the Governor Kepala Daerah Tingkat I, who
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
performs a dual function. First, as a Governor, he serves as 
the representative of the central government in the region and 
is in charge of overseeing and coordinating the implementation 
of the sectoral programs deconcentrated by the center to all 
of the vertical institutions stationed in his region. Second, 
as a Kepala Daerah Tingkat I, he is the highest ranking 
official in his region, and is responsible for administering 
the government of Daerah Otonom Tingkat I. In this context, 
his prime task is to manage the implementation of 
decentralized development programs funded by the provincial 
budget. To some extent, he reports to the Provincial 
Representative Council, since any program he is going to 
launch can only be implemented after being authorized by this 
institution. The unification of these two entities results in 
the unification of the provincial governmental structure, 
presented in Figure 2.2.
In addition to the decentralization and déconcentration 
principles, the central government also delegates some of its 
authority to be partly administered by provincial governments 
through medebewind, meaning cooperation. This channel is 
mainly exercised by the center in distributing grants through 
the Provincial Subsidy Scheme (Inpres Dati I) . These grants 
are disbursed by the center to be directly attached to 
provincial annual budgets. Although they are delegated to the 
local governments, to a great extent policies are set by the 
central government. The provincial government can only
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implement the program, and to some extent, adjust the central 
directions to the local conditions, in accordance with 
guidelines previously set by the center. Since funding 
disbursed via this channel makes up about 60 per cent of the 
total provincial annual budget, the determination of its 
allocation and the degree of control over how it is carried 
out, is critical to the independence of the provincial 
government.
2.4. Structure of Provincial Government
The extent to which the Decentralization Law serves as a 
^constitution' for regional government is indicated by the 
organizational framework it authorizes. Specifically, law 
N o . 5 of 1974 provides for two crucial entities: the Chief
Executive of the Province (Gubernur Kepala Daerah Tingkat I), 
and the Provincial Representative Council. Since the Governor 
holds dual functions, this office is not entirely elective. 
The Governor is elected by the Provincial Representative 
Council in the sense that two to five candidates from 
nominations by the factions within the Council are voted on 
and submitted to the central government, however, the final 
selection is made from among these candidates directly by the 
President. Through that procedure, the Governor, becomes both 
in charge of administering the regional government and 
simultaneously in charge of coordinating the central 
government interests or programs in his region. In detail.
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his prime task is to:
1. initiate policy for his region;
2. coordinate all the service departments that operate 
in his region and to coordinate these same service 
departments with the provincial government;
3. supervise the operation of the provincial 
government and the local governments within his 
jurisdiction;
4. undertake other duties entrusted to him by the 
central authority.
The Provincial Representative Council is the legislative 
body of the provincial government. Its members are elected 
through a general election held every five years, in which the 
three political parties recognized by the system participate. 
Its prime task is to scrutinize development programs submitted 
by the Governor, and together with the Governor, promulgate 
provincial legislation.
The Speaker of the Council is usually chosen from the 
political party which dominates the council's seats, and he 
has three Deputy Speakers each chosen by each party in the 
Council.
Another important agency inherently linked to the 
Provincial Government is the Provincial Inspectorate, led by 
a Provincial Inspector and staffed by the provincial civil 
service. The agency is responsible for controlling the use of 
both development and routine budgets of the provincial 
government.
Department of Public Works, op.cit., p. 5
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2.5. Provincial Planning
For political and economic reasons, the development 
apparatus of the nation, particularly during the First Five- 
Year Development Plan {1969/70 - 1973/74), was characterized 
by a high degree of concern with planning, policy making, 
program identification, budgeting, and implementation. 
Responsibility for national planning was concentrated in the 
National Planning Board, and the sectoral departments located 
in Jakarta. To ensure the implementation of the centrally 
generated programs, the Regional Development Division of the 
Board established across the nation ten 'development centers." 
(Map 2.3). Each center was supposed to be a "growth center" 
to which the central government would allocate a greater 
degree of funding and locate major projects in the hope that 
benefits would trickle down to the adjacent areas. Most plans 
and programs were administered by the national agencies with 
insufficient provincial participation.^^
The lack of validity of this concept has persuaded the 
central government to shift to a more decentralized pattern of 
development mechanism which gives more latitude to the 
regional governments to translate regional planning into 
reality. This was followed by the establishment of Provincial 
Development Planning Boards in 1974, which were intended to be 
the sole planning agency concerned with comprehensive 
provincial planning and intersectoral coordination in
23 IBRD, o p .cit., p .3
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development implementation. Their prime function is to assist 
the Governors regarding regional development planning 
activities.
Since regional planning currently undertaken at local 
levels is funded by three different sources, the existence of 
the Board becomes more crucial. In the first instance, it is 
in charge of devising the overall provincial plans, 
including lists of projects and programs to be funded by the 
provincial budget, both from genuine provincial income and the 
Provincial Subsidy Scheme. Prior to its submission to the 
central government, the proposal must be presented by the 
Governor to the Provincial Representative Council.
The second main task of the Boards is to coordinate 
vertical Agencies in arranging the proposals of sectoral 
development plans to be funded by the central government.
The involvement of the Board within the process is to prevent 
conflict and duplication between provincial and sectoral 
plans. The tasks of the Boards are elaborated in Chapter 3.
2.6. Provincial Budget
The Provincial Budgets are divided into recurrent 
operating receipts and expenditures on the one hand, and 
development receipts and expenditures on the other. Both 
recurrent and development receipts rely heavily on central 
grants and subsidies, as well as taxes which are turned over
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to the respective regions.^'’
Central subsidies granted through provincial recurrent
revenue are known as Autonomous Regions Subsidy (Subsidi
Daerah Otonom). They are mainly devoted to paying the 
salaries, pensions and honorariums of the local governments' 
staff and employees, and make up about 82 percent of the 
total routine revenues. The genuine provincial routine 
receipts are primarily used for maintenance of the local 
properties, such as buildings, and purchase of office
supplies. Funding for each province is calculated mainly on
the basis of staff currently employed by the provincial 
government.
In addition to this routine subsidy, this central 
authority also disburses annual development block grants for 
the provincial governments, known as Provincial Subsidy 
Scheme. It accounts for almost 60 per cent of the total 
provincial development receipts. Unlike Subsidi Daerah 
Otonom, the allocation of this scheme is administered on an 
equal basis. Each province receives the same funding, and the 
regulations for using it. All funding should be utilized 
completely during the ongoing fiscal year. Provincial 
development genuine revenues, which constitutes around 40 per 
cent of the provincial revenues, are mainly used to construct 
and to purchase projects and equipment that are prohibited for 
funding through the central grants.
24 Department of Public Works, op.cit., p. 25.
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Furthermore, the role of the Provincial Subsidy Scheme as 
the largest source of local development revenue, and its 
rationale and objective are will be thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
PROVINCIAL SUBSIDY SCHEME 
PROCESS AND POLICY
3.1. Program Rationale and Description
Following the original objectives of ensuring national 
unity and spurring economic growth through a centralized 
pattern of government and regional redistribution Indonesia is 
today struggling to produce greater equity and social justice 
in development benefits. Actually, stages of development 
which are currently taking place were largely outlined in the 
Twenty-Five Year Development Strategy following the 
determination of the new Indonesian government to implement a 
more comprehensive national development plan. The prime 
objective of the plan are the improvement of the quality of 
life of the population under a strong national leadership by 
promoting economic growth and building a cohesive political 
structure.
After his inauguration as the new President in 1967, 
Suharto ordered the newly established National Development 
Planning Board (BAPPENAS - Badan Perencanaan Pembanqunan 
Nasional) to commence preliminary steps to draft a new Five- 
Year Plan (PELITA) . The drafting process took almost two 
years, from March 1967 until it was presented to the 
Parliament in January 1969. Because it was led and staffed 
by leading well-trained economists and planner, the
42
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BAPPENAS could have completed the plan sooner. Nevertheles, 
Stephen Hoadly^^ contains that this lapse of time was 
deliberately set by the Suharto government. First, he 
maintains that the President himself indicated in 1967 that 
the plan should not come into effect until 1969, by which time 
it was hoped that economic stability especially price 
stability, would be achieved; physical and economic 
infrastructure rehabilitation gotten well underway; and 
political as well as administrative institutions firmly 
established under the New Order government. If this was the 
case, the Bappenas was fortunate not to be compelled to work 
against a very strict deadline, as had the former National 
Planning Agency in 1956-1960. Second, the President, in some 
of his Presidential Addresses, gave only some broad policies 
and guidelines to be considered by the planners. Among other 
things, the Plan was supposed to provide for growth in all 
economic production sectors, such as heavy industry. In 
addition, more balanced regional and sectoral development 
programs would lead to the formation of a just and prosperous 
Indonesian society.
“ Stephen Hoadey, The Politics of Development 
Planning Agencies: The Evolution of Indonesia's Bappenas, 
Paper delivered at the New Zealand Political Studies 
Association Conference. (Wellington: March 1976), p. 10.
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Given the expertise of the Bappenas' staff and senior 
officials, the tasks of combining all of these objectives 
together were possible. However, major problems arose when 
the planners had to rely on their political acumen to 
determine what was politically acceptable as well as 
economically feasible. In addition, the Bappenas has also 
been firmly convinced that it needed to emphasize macro and 
sectoral planning, although it was realized that it tended to 
accentuate regional disparities in growth and development. 
Therefore, finding an adequate balance between the 
acceleration of economic growth and the need to reduce 
regional inequalities was another objective it had to pursue.
The result was the first Five-Year Development Plan 
(REPELITA I) which was to be launched in 1969/1970-1974/1975.
In this plan, political stability, national integrity and 
economic rehabilitation, together with the depolization of 
political activities, were greatly stressed. To guarantee 
social stability, the government then tried to control prices 
by ensuring the availability of at least nine basic 
commodities in the market place, while the focus of 
development was emphasized on economic and social development 
at the national level. Inevitably, public sector investment 
objectives should be concentrated on the construction and 
rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure facilities, 
such as highways, electricity and irrigation systems, public 
schools and hospitals, and the like. The Domestic market was
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even opened up to international investment. The resultant 
economic growth was remarkable, and the hyperinflation 
inherited from the former administration had significantly 
been reduced. More importantly, as presented in Table 3.1., 
because of an increase of the price of oil on the 
international market in the 1970s, the national revenue also 
increased tremendously.
This increased revenue has enabled the government to expand 
its functions by launching a variety of programs in the years 
until 1982 when the petroleum price dropped.
Table 3.1
National Recurrent and Development Budget 
During the First Five-Year Development Plan,
1969/70 -1973/74 
(In Billion Rupiahs)
No . Fiscal
Year
Recurrent
Budget
Development
Budget
Total
1 . 1969/70 217 118 335
2. 1970/71 288 170 458
3 . 1971/72 349 196 545
4 . 1972/73 438 298 736
5. 1973/74 713 451 1,164
Total 2, 005 1,233 3,238
Source : Department of Interior of Indonesia; The Role and
Function of the Directorate General of Regional Development. 
Appendix 4., p. 124.
Note : $US1 is approximately Rp.300.
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During the early 1970's 58.53 per cent or 
Rp.721,737,802,100, out of Rp.1,233,000,000,000 of the 
national development budget was disbursed for regional 
planning activities. Unfortunately, because of the highly 
centralized nature of the development mechanism, about 73.92 
per cent or R p . 533, 491, 000, 000, out of this funding was 
directly generated from the center through sectoral 
development programs, undertaken by the vertical agencies 
stationed throughout the regions. Only 12.36 per cent or 
R p .89,251,902,100, was delegated to be administered by the 
regional authorities. This kind of funding was channelled 
through the first three Regional Development Programs launched 
under the Presidential Decree Programs (Program Inpres), 
initiated during this period. However, funding for these 
three programs was not supposed to be directly included in the 
provincial annual budget. Rather, it was devoted to the 
second level of local governments (kabupaten and Kotamadya), 
and designed to develop badly needed infrastucture in the 
rural areas. In addition, the central government also 
allocated annual grants for each province to cover their 
development expenditures, disbursed through the Automatic 
Foreign Exchange Scheme (Alokasi Devisa Otomatis - ADO). 
Until 1973/74, funding allocated via the ADO Scheme accounted 
for Rp.98,994,000,000.
The provincial governments also have their own financial 
sources derived from local taxation. Therefore, during
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this period, there were four basic sources to finance regional 
development activities, three of which came from the central 
budget. The breakdown for each sheme is presented in Table
3.2.
Table 3.2.
Percentage of Regional Development Sources 
of Funding, 1969/70 - 1973/74
(In Thousand Rupiahs)
No . Programs Amount Percentage
1 . Sectoral 533.491,000.00 69.36
2 . Presidential Decree
- Village Subsidy 26,840,000.00
- Regency Subsidy 46,596,902.10
- Primary Scholl Subsidy 15,815,000.00
11. 60
3. ADO Scheme 98,994,900.00 12.87
4 . Provincial Funds 47,445,320.00 6.17
Total 769,183,122.10 100.00
Source : Republic of Indonesia, Department of Information, The
First Five-Year Development Plan, 1969/70-1973/74. Figure for 
ADO was derived from Department of Information, Presidential 
Address, 1979, Chap. XII, p. 10; while figure for local fund 
was taken from Department of Interior, The Role and the 
Function, op,cit.. Appendix 5, p. 120.
Note : $US1 is approximately Rp.300.
However, since this study is mainly directed at exploring 
regional planning activities at the provincial level funded 
both by the provincial funds and the provincial subsidy 
scheme, sectoral programs generated from the center 
and other kinds of Presidential Decree Programs will not be
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discussed.
From Table 3.2. it is clear how dependent the provincial 
governments were upon central grants (ADO). During that time, 
total provincial development budgets were Rp.146, 440,220, 000 . 
Provincial funds accounted for only Rp.47,445,320,000 (32.40 
per cent), while the remaining Rp.98,994,900,000 (67.60 per
cent) was the contribution of ADO.
The main purpose of distributing grants via ADO was to 
help the regional governments finance development 
expenditures. Ironically, Sanders found that a significant 
part of the ADO allocation was used to cover deficits in 
routine budgets. In West Java alone, he found that 75 per 
cent of the ADO allocation was devoted to such a deficit, 
while in Jambi the situation was even worse, and almost all of 
the ADO grant was diverted to routine expenditures.^®
By its nature, the ADO Scheme was partially supposed to 
be a method of inducing the regions to revive exports, in 
conjunction with the overall economic program to rehabilitate 
and stabilize the economy.^' Through this scheme, each 
province was authorized to collect a ten per cent share of the 
value of goods and services exported from it, with the
Martin Sanders, "Regional Finance in Indonesia," 
Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies, Vol. VI, No. 3. 
(Canberra: 1970), p. 73.
27 Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti, op.cit., p. 147.
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exception of petroleum, tin, and bauxite. As such, ADO funds 
accrued only to the province from which the export took place, 
not to the producing provinces."® Under these circumstances, 
regions with significant export Oproduction but without 
harbour facilities received hardly any ADO funds, where as 
other regions, such as the capital city of Jakarta, were 
entitled to substantial ADO revenue, even though they produced 
little for export. Consequently, central block grants to 
provinces disbursed via ADO were highly imbalanced.
Another deficiency implicit in the ADO Scheme was that 
provinces which produced vital non-export commodities, such as 
rice and sugar, would barely get any benefit from the 
system."® Under the ADO-Scheme the central administration in 
essence gave no assistance to provinces producing commodities 
for inter-provincial trade. Consequently, in order to obtain 
foreign exchange, the governments of rice surplus regions 
preferred to export their products, even at lower prices, 
while the non rice-producing areas had to spend ADO proceeds 
to purchase rice from abroad.
More disastrously, to be able to export, each province 
tended to construct its own port, although with minimum 
facilities. Exports from these smaller ports were to
28 Martin Sanders, op.cit., p. 71.
Hariri Hady, "Daerahnya Pusat, Pusatnya Daerah," 
Prisma, Vol. Ill, No. 2. (Jakarta: 1974), p. 70.
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Singapore for sorting and upgrading, with two additional 
drawbacks for Indonesia. Firstly, the higher export revenue 
obtainable for export goods that had been upgraded and sorted 
within the country was lost. Secondly, it caused the loss of 
additional employment opportunities .
The ADO Scheme also had an effect on regional 
inequalities. In 1969, for example, funding granted by the 
center through the ADO Scheme was Rp.14, 636, 700, 000. Out of 
this amount, R p .8,399,000,000, was allocated to five leading 
exporting provinces, whereas the rest of Rp.6,237,700,000, was 
unevenly disbursed to another 21 provinces. Here, North and 
South Sumatra, which produce rubber and other crucial 
commodities, such as cooking oil, tobacco, and wood, received 
more than Rp.2,000,000,000. each, while so-called minus 
provinces, such as East and West Nusa Tenggara, received only 
Rp.24,100,000, and Rp.11,300,000, respectively.
Dissatisfaction with inequalities and other defects of 
both central planning and the ADO system led the government to 
come up with a more equalized pattern of regional 
redistribution. From this point onward, balanced regional 
growth was designated as the main agenda of national 
development.
In conjunction with regional development, the central 
government then undertook measures aimed at improving the 
situation by replacing the ADO Scheme with the Government
30 Martin Sanders, op.cit., pp. 72-73
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Grant in Lieu of ADO. Under this system, each province would 
receive a grant equal to its former ADO revenue plus an 
additional flat sum of five per cent across the board.
Theoretically, differences in grants among provinces 
would be narrowed. However, if grants allocated by the center 
through this new mechanism, as shown in Table 3.3 are 
carefully examined, the promise of improvement brought by this 
new arrangement was still illusive. While the number of 
provinces which received more than one billion increased from 
five to eight provinces, in succeeding years, two of them. 
West Java and East Kalimantan, reverted to funding equal to 
their former ADO share. On the other hand. South and North 
Sumatera, the biggest exporting regions, experienced a 
tremendous gain by receiving more than four billion each, 
while regions like Yogyakarta, Bali and Maluku received 
funding even smaller than they did under the ADO Scheme.
To attempt to control the ever widening regional 
disparities, in 1974 the central administration then 
introduced a more equalized financial arrangement the so- 
called Provincial Subsidy Scheme (Inpres Propinsi).
Under this system, the direct link between subsidy and 
regional export performance was abandoned. Funding disbursed 
to each province was related to the real needs of the province 
with special attention to deficit areas.
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Table 3.3.
The Allocation of Regional Funding Through 
The ADO and the Government Grant in Lieu of ADO-Scheme
1969/70 - 1973/74 
( (n Million Rupiahs)
Provinces 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74
D.I. Aceh 306.0 300.0 406.0 406.0 406.5
N . Sumatera 2,850.0 4,415.9 5,326.8 4,490.0 4,754.2
W. Sumatera 374.9 391.2 549.9 498.0 470 .9Riau 541.4 1,266.0 1,026.4 1,071.7 1,071.7
Jambi 510.0 884.5 884.5 884.5 834.1
S. Sumatera 2,190.0 2,762.5 3 ,884.6 4,159.3 4,159.3Bengkulu 210.0 493.3 155 . 0 34.6 72.4
Lampung 1,13 9.0 1,457.5 1,487.5 1,487.5 1,487.5
Jakarta 200.0 300.0 300.0 350.0 311. 9
West Java 950.5 1,227.0 967.8 957.3 967.8
Central Java 830.0 664.0 450.0 490.0 499.1
Yogyakarta 25.2 19.5 - 10 . 0 12.6
East Java 1,200.0 1, 500. 0 1,500.0 1,388.2 1,388.2
W. Kalimantanl,020.0 1,305.1 1,186.7 1,186.7 1,186.7
C. Kalimantan 210.0 325.4 320.8 320.8 321.0
S. Kalimantan 400.0 630.0 605.0 605.0 605.1
E. Kalimantan 540.2 1,635.6 824.7 898.2 824.7
N. Sulawesi 406.3 406.2 397.7 397.0 397.0
C . Sulawesi 168.2 360.0 250.0 211 .8 213.9
S. Sulawesi 165.0 175.0 150 . 0 150.0 143.0
S.E. Sulawesi 89.5 112.5 112.9 112.5 112.6
Bali 130.1 68.0 140 . 0 82.0 83.0
W. Nusatenggara 24.1 25.0 25.0 24.2 24.2
E, Nusatenggara 11.3 50.0 135.5 134 .1 60.5
Maluku 135.0 160.0 105.0 — 71.4
Irian Jaya
■ ■ ■
Total 14,636.7 20,992.7 21,151 .1 21,661.6 20,552.8
Source: Department of Information. Presidential Address.
(Jakarta: 1979), Chap. XII., P- XII/10 . ADO was
implemented only until 1970, and then replaced by the
Government 
Note : $US1
Grant in Lieu of ADO until 
is approximately Rp.300.
1974
The purpose was to equalize the rate of growth among regions. 
Probably, this move was made possible because the resources
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of the regime were becoming greater, and its power was more 
fully consolidated than ever before. 31
3.2. Program Strategy and Objectives
The Second Five-Year Development Plan, launched in 
1974/75-1978/79, saw a very impressive change and shift in 
regional policy and practice in Indonesia. Starting from this 
point in time, a growing interest in decentralization 
materialized with the introduction of another four regional 
programs. Two of them were directly implemented in the 
1974/1975 fiscal year, while the other two were put into 
operation the following year. The last program was initiated 
in 1979/80, that is in the first year of the Third Five-Year 
Development Plan. Because of its specific features, the 
Provincial Subsidy Scheme is the most crucial one.
Basically, the Provincial Subsidy Scheme was merely meant 
to be the continuation of the Central Grant in Lieu of ADO, in 
an improved version. A significant increase in national 
revenue made the inception of this program possible. From the 
state financial statistics presented in Table 3.4., one can 
see that during the Second Five-Year Development Plan, central 
revenues increased by 455.9 per cent, or from 
R p .3,238,000,000,000 in the First Five-Year Plan to 
Rp.18,000,000,000,000 in the Second Five -Year Plan.
31 Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti, op.cit., p. 151
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
The table also indicate the development budget accounted 
for R p . 9, 128, 000, 000,000, while the remainder,
Rp. 8,872,000,000,000, was for the routine budget. Supported 
by such a huge funds, the central government could increase 
the allocation for regional planning by 494.31 per cent. A 
tremendous increase in state revenues continued through 
1983/84.
Table 3.4
National Recurrent and Development Budget 
During the Second and Third Five-Year 
Development Plan, 1974/75 - 1983/84 
(In Billion Rupiahs)
No . Fiscal Recurrent Development Total Period
Year Budget Budget
1 . 1974/75 1,016 962 1,978
2 . 1975/76 1,333 1,398 2,731
3. 1976/77 1,630 2,055 3,685 PELITA II
4 . 1977/78 2, 149 2, 157 4,306 74/75-78/79
5. 1978/79 2,744 2,566 5,300
Total 8,872 9,128 18,000
6 . 1979/80 4,062 4,014 8, 076
7 . 1980/81 5, 800 5,916 11,716
8 . 1981/82 7,501 6,399 13,900 PELITA III
9. 1982/83 7,002 8,606 15,608 79/80-83/84
10 . 1983/84 7,275 9,290 16,565
Total 31,640 34,225 65,865
Source
Financial Statement, Jakarta: 1974 - 1984. 
Note :
Annual State
 Pelita is acronym
During the Pelita I, $US1 
during the Pelita II it was Rp.800.
for Five-Year Development Plan, 
was approximately Rp.300, while
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In spite of such a dramatic increase in revenue , it was 
still possible to control centrally, to, some extent.
However, because of the limits of central planning in 
distributing the fruits of development, and the danger of 
congestion within the central bureaucracy, the government 
decided to share burdens in providing services with the local 
authorities .
More interestingly, the central administration felt that 
time had come to educate the local people in taking charge of 
their development activities. For that purpose, as presented 
in Table 3.5., the central government then divided that
portion of the development budget specified for regional
affairs into three important parts, i.e.. Sectoral Programs, 
Presidential Decree Programs, and Provincial Programs.
Table 3.5. shows that total funding devoted to regional 
planning during the Second and the Third Five-Year Development 
Plans was Rp.21,350,396,574,000. Out of this amount, 
Rp.12,622,965,000,000 was fully controlled by the central 
government through sectorally generated projects. Eighteen 
different sectors were covered, within which 46,235 projects 
were completed during this ten-year period dispersed
throughout the country.
Department of Interior, The Role and The Function, 
op.cit., p . 77.
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Table 3.5
Percentage of Regional Development Sources of Funding,
1974/75 - 1983/84 
(In Thousand Rupiahs)
No . Programs Amount Percentage
1 . Sectoral 12,622,965,000 59.13
2 . Presidential Decree
- Village Subsidy 426,508,606 1.99
- Regency Subsidy 1,064,269,300 4 .99
- Primary School 2,247,830,490 10.53
- Community Health 450,490,334 2 .11
- Provincial Subsidy 1,307,173,450 6 .12
- Market Building 305,000,000 1.43
- Regreening Subsidy 410,568,000 1 . 93
- Local Road Subsidy 261,996,800 1.22
3. Provincial Funds 2,253,594,594 10.55
Total 21,350,396,574 100.00
Source: Compiled from Department of Interior, The Role and
the Function of the Directorate General of Regional
Development, op.cit., pp. 77-84.
In addition, funding channelled through Presidential 
Decree Programs also increased to Rp.6,473, 836, 682, 000. The 
portion devoted to the Provincial Subsidy Scheme was 
Rp.1,307,173,450,000, out of which Rp.317,361,450,000 was 
devoted to finance development programs during the second 
five-year development plan, whereas the remainder, 
Rp.989,812,000,000, was disbursed during the five succeeding 
years.
During the same period of time, the provincial 
governments could also utilize their own revenues derived from
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local taxation, amounting to a further R p .2, 253, 594, 000, 000. 
Therefore, development budgets intrinsically managed by the 
regional administrations amounted to Rp.3,560,768,044,000, 
the sum of the Provincial Subsidy Scheme plus the provincial 
funds. The budget during the Third Five-Year Development Plan 
was much larger than that of the previous five year term. The 
breakdown for comparison is given in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6
Provincial Development Budget 
1969/70 - 1983/84 
(In Thousand Rupiahs)
No Sources Amount Percentage Period
1 . ADO Scheme 98,994,900 67.60 PELITA I
2 . Provincial Funds 47,445,320 32 .40 69/70-73/74
Total 146,440,220 100.00
1 . Provincial Subsidy 317,361,450 44 . 96 PELITA II
2 . Provincial Funds 388,601,938 55.04 74/75-78/79
Total 705,963,388 100.00
1 . Provincial Subsidy 989,812,000 34.67 PELITA III
2 . Provincial Funds 1,864,992,456 65.33 79/80-83/84
Total 2,854,804,456 100.00
Source; Compiled from Department of Interior, op,cit., p. 63
The table clearly shows how the percentage share of 
central grants allocated through the ADO Scheme and the 
Provincial Subsidy Scheme within the provincial development
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program decreases with time. On the other hand, it also 
represents the improved ability of local governments in 
raising their own revenue. However, if the situation which 
lies behind these figures is carefully scrutinized, some 
provocative facts emerge.
First, although the provincial governments have been able 
to exploit their own economic sources so as to enable them to 
derive more funds for their own purposes, this was unevenly 
distributed among regions. For example, out of the 
Rp. 47, 445, 320, 000 representing self generated provincial 
development budgets from the First Five-Year Development Plan, 
about 67 percent was contributed by four provinces:
North and South Sumatera, Greater Jakarta and East Kalimantan. 
The other 33 percent was unequally dispersed to the other 22 
provinces. Although the distribution tends to improve with 
time, the ability of each provincial government to mobilize 
local sources was still unequal. In other words, development 
funds collected locally have always been imbalanced
Secondly, the inequality of funding also occurred within 
the sectoral programs, since it is impossible to disburse 
balanced grants to each area. This difference in central 
budget allocation then resulted in dissimilarities in the 
number of projects that could be completed in each region, as 
well as contributing to irregular regional economic growth.
Given this background, the introduction of the Provincial 
Subsidy Scheme was simply meant as a device to reduce these
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disparities. In detail, its role within the overall planning 
network in Indonesia is:
(1) . to balance regional and sectoral development 
plans by including regional considerations into 
sectoral programs;
(2). to reduce disparities in the rate of growth and 
development among regions resulting partly from the 
imbalance of central grants disbursed via the ADO 
Scheme ;
(3). to help provincial governments solve large-scale 
provincial problems by balancing sectoral priorities 
with regional needs;
(4). to improve the capability of the local 
governments to plan, to manage, and to control 
development programs undertaken within their 
jurisdictions.”
To ensure that these objectives could be successfully 
achieved, the central government then implemented policies 
consisting of four essential elements: first, planning at the
center for a hierarchy of planning regions and for the 
provinces within them; second, considering the spatial 
aspects of sectoral planning; third, integrating national 
and sectoral plans at the regional level, taking into account 
regional goals; and, fourth, the devolution of planning 
responsibility to various levels of local government.
It was inevitable that planning institutions would have 
to be created at the regional level to receive delegated 
authority in devising regional development plans, in which
” See International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, A Framework for Regional Planning in 
Indonesia, Vol. I, Executive Summary. (East Asia and 
Pasific Regional Office: 1974), p. 1.
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aspects of sectoral and local developments would be combined. 
The so-called Provincial Planning Boards (BAPPEDAs), were 
established in 1974, and their assigned tasks spesifically 
include :
(1) . The translation of national development policies, 
plans and programs into effective provincial 
development action (particularly, for example, those 
policies concerned with the national growth center 
strategy as this affects the province concerned);
(2). The formation of systematic provincial plans, 
integrated with the national plan, but expressing 
specific provincial development priorities in relation 
to local development problems needs;
(3). The conversion of this provincial plan into 
integrated sectoral programs and the organization of 
the development apparatus needed at the provincial 
level to secure effective intersectoral coordination 
in development implementation;
(4) The identification of specific subregions within 
the provinces for concentrated development attention 
designed to reduce internal development disparities;
(5). The provision of expert advice to the provincial 
government on the priorities required in sectoral 
budgetary allocations both for the Five-Year Plan and 
the annual program;
(5). The organization of procedures for the systematic 
and regular evaluation of developmental progress 
within the provinces, sector by sector; that is, the 
organization of a provincial development information 
system.
Collin Rosser, Training in Regional Development in 
Indonesia. (Jakarta: BAPPENAS, 1974), pp. 19-20.
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If the implications are thoroughly examined, there were 
consequences which needed to be considered by the government. 
First, the government should review its policy emphasizing 
economic growth, since there may be conflicts between high 
economic growth and equitable regional development. More 
importantly, it would also require that the center pay more 
attention to: (1) the spatial aspects of growth within and
between sectors; (2) the greater needs of spreading out 
administrative and political responsibilities of the central 
authority to the lower level agencies; and (3) the necessity 
for political channels to enable the local people to take part 
properly in the development process.
Quite clearly this poses a dilemma. However, encouraged 
by the political stability achieved over the previous five 
years, and with the realization of the deficiencies of urban 
oriented development, the government decided to institute 
regional planning. However, the form of decentralization to 
be implemented was still firmly linked to the nature of the 
unitary state. The clear implication is that residual power 
must always remain with the central government. This decision 
demonstrated that there was still some fear of allowing 
devolution of power to go too far, getting out of hand, and 
destroying the unity which had been so carefully nurtured over 
the years. Hence, the decentralization of power and 
responsibility was contained within the field of executive 
responsibility only, and did not as yet involve change in the
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legislative position of the local authority.“ As such, the 
role of the Provincial Subsidy Scheme within the overall 
planning network in Indonesia was not meant to consolidate the 
political bargaining leverage of the local government vis-a- 
vis the central authority. It was only designed for an 
administrative purpose, i.e., to strengthen the capability of 
local agencies in managing development programs.
Consequently, the central authority needed to devolve 
only a limited amount of power and responsibility to the local 
agencies and were able to address a political necessity with 
minimum concessions from the center.
3.3. Administrative Procedure
The annual operating cycle of the overall provincial 
development program, of which the Provincial Subsidy Scheme 
funding is an inherent part, is geared to the timing of the 
national budget. Both start and end simultaneously. The 
process begins in the early July, when each regency government 
on behalf of the provincial government requests that all of 
the village authorities under their jurisdiction undertake a 
series of meetings to prepare lists of priority projects for 
submission to the central administration. Usually, the 
provincial government forecasts the next year's budget on the 
basis of the current budget. In detail:
35 I.B.R.D., op.cit., p.3
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(1). Under the guidance of the District Government, 
the village authority prepares a list of the projects 
that need to be covered in the budget of the 
succeeding fiscal year that will begin the following 
April;
(2). The list of these projects is then thoroughly 
discussed and refined at the District level;
(3). The list is then carefully examined in the 
Regency Development Coordination Meeting by regency 
technical officers. This examination involves: (a) 
making any necessary measurements at the location of 
the proposed projects; (b) carrying out any 
investigation necessary for constructing earthworks, 
foundations, etc., e.g., drilling and sounding; (c) 
other research into resource materials, e.g., local 
stone and gravel; (d) analysis of planned 
expenditures ;
(4). The kinds of expenditures that can be included 
into projects consist of: (a) preparation expenditures
(b) construction plus taxes; (c) general expenditures 
for project leadership, project treasurer, technical 
staff, field supervision, administrative staff, and 
any other officials {the appointment of these 
officials must be confirmed in writing by the 
Governor); (d) expenditures for travel to the
provincial offices for committee meetings, or to the 
projects for supervision, and (e) administrative costs 
including purchase of writing materials, preparation 
of papers and photos for the project;
(5). Summaries of expenditures for each kind of 
projects, the projects themselves, the types of 
monthly expenditures, and a schedule of daily wages as 
well as prices of the required construction materials 
are then handed over to the Governor to be translated 
into project proposal (DUPDA). On the provincial 
level, the task of combining all of these items 
together is undertaken by the Provincial Planning 
Board, assisted both by the provincial technical 
departments concerned, such as Department of Public 
Works, Department of Manpower, Department of Health 
and Department of Education, and bureaus within the 
Executive Secretariat of the Governor office;
(6). By mid November, the central government, 
represented by all central departments and led by the 
National Planning Board, organizes the National 
Development Meeting. On this occasion, the provincial 
governments are expected to present their project
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proposals to be scrutinized by the central officials. 
The purpose is to ensure that all of central 
regulations, prohibitions and guidelines have been 
followed. In special cases where central guidance and 
regulation could not be conformed with, the central 
authority makes the necessary adjustment;
(7). The meeting then concludes with the preliminary 
central approval of the regional planning program 
proposed by the local authorities;
(8). Based on this national meeting, the central 
government then tries to reconcile development 
expenditures submitted by the local governments with 
its expected revenue for the next fiscal year. After 
a series of limited meetings intensively organized on 
the national level, the central government then comes 
up with the exact amount of funding to be disbursed 
for regional affairs. It is usually presented by the 
President of the Republic in the first week of 
January. As stated above, this funding consists of 
two important sections: guided and directed funds;
(9). Given this information, the provincial 
governments then decide which projects should be 
funded by which source. This is important since each 
source of funding i.e., guided funds, directed funds 
locally derived funds, has its own regulations. The 
result of this examination is then presented again 
before the central Supervisory Team which comes to 
each region to give the final approval to the 
proposals .
3.4. Program Finance
Following a pattern established in 1974 in the nationwide 
Provincial Subsidy Scheme, and departing from 
what was then established practice, the program was funded 
through the national budget with allocation made directly to
Departemen Dalam Negeri, Direktorat Jenderal 
Pembangunan Daerah, Petuniuk Pelaksanaan Pembar.gunan Daerah 
Tingkat I Tahun 1984/85-1989/1990 . (Jakarta: 1984), 
p p . 15-2 2.
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each individual province. Initially, the portion given to 
each region was decided on the ground of minimum and maximum 
allocation of Rp.500,000,000 and maximum allocation of 
R p . 5, 659, 000, 000 were given to Irian Jaya and East Java 
respectively. Comparatively, the ratio between these two 
allocations was 11.3 : 1. Compared to the ratio between the 
lowest and the highest allocation granted through the Central 
Grant in Lieu of ADO a year before, this ratio has improved 
greatly. In the previous year, 1973/1974, North Sumatera 
received the highest grant, amounting to Rp. 4, 754, 200,000 and 
the lowest grant, Rp.12,600,000 was disbursed to Yogjakarta. 
In that year, the ratio was 375.7 : 1. The report released by 
the Department of Interior is presented in Table 3.7. and 
shows that the ratio between the lowest and the highest 
allotment tends to become narrower with time.
However, the criteria that are used by the central 
government in making this allocation are not clear or 
explicit. Given the large regional disparities that existed 
under the former grant system, reducing the gap should be one 
of the main objectives. Practical consideration are 
another criterion. T.A. Salim has stated that the prime 
consideration used in arranging this minimum and maximum 
allocation policy was: (1) the length of roads and bridges
that need to be improved or maintained; and (2) the width of
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Table 3.7
Ratio Between the Highest and the Lowest Funding 
Granted to Each Province During 1973/74 - 1983/84
(In Million Rupiahs)
No . Y e a r
A l i o
Highest
c a t i o n
Lowest
R a t i O
1 . 1973/1974 *) 4,734.2 12.6 375.7 • 1
2. 1974/1975 5,659.0 500.0 11.3 1
3. 1975/1976 6,366.0 750.0 8.5 1
4 . 1976/1977 7,068.0 1,000.0 7.0 1
5. 1977/1978 7,774.0 1,500.0 5.0 1
6. 1978/1979 8, 174.0 2,000.0 4.0 1
7 . 1979/1980 8,875.0 2,500.0 3.5 ; 1
8 . 1980/1981 9,980.0 5,000.0 2 . 0 ; 1
9. 1981/1982 10,000.0 7,500.0 1.3 1
10. 1982/1983 11, 000 .0 9,000.0 1.2 ; 1
11 . 1983/1984 11,000.0 9,000.0 1.2 • 1
Source : Department of Interior, Directorate General of
Regional Development, Report on the Conduct of Provincial 
Development Program, op.cit., p. 9.
*) : Funding allotted through the Grant in Lieu of ADO Scheme.
In each successive year this grant was increased 
gradually, but the criteria for deciding the minimum and the 
maximum allotment for the regions becomes more blurred.
For example, by 1982/1983, the ratio had been reduced to 
1.2 : 1. From this time, it can be argued that the central 
government wants to give the impression that it does not favor
T.A. Salim, "Program dan Proyek Bantuan Kepada 
Daerah, "Prisma, No. 2., Vol. III. (Jakarta: 1974), p. 24.
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any particular region at the expense of others. In 1988/89 
the allocation was equalized, and all regions received Rp.l2 
billion. Quite clearly the allocation for each year depends 
on the national revenue.^®
For instance, in the year of its inception, funding 
channelled through this program totalled Rp.43, 950, 000, 000 
and was used to finance 2,301 projects. Only five regions 
received allotments of four billion rupiahs or more, and seven 
regions received between one and two billionrupiahs.
The remaining fourteen provinces received between five hundred 
million and one billion rupiahs.
Because of increased national revenue, by 1978/79, the 
government raised grants for this program to 
Rp.85,674,450,000,000 or an increase of 94.93 per cent. In 
this year, ratio between the highest and the lowest allocation 
was 4 : 1, with 1,844 projects completed.
Furthermore, unlike programs funded through the ADO 
Scheme, funding for this program is divided into two portions.
The first one is called the decided fund (dana yang
ditetapkan), designated to finance three important subsectors;
(1) roads and bridges improvement; (2) dam irrigation
improvement; and (3) irrigation exploitation and maintenance. 
The second one is known as the directed fund (dana yang
diarahkan), which can be utilized for any program designed
38 See Marian Umum KOMPAS, op.cit., p. 1.
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specifically to meet the real needs of each
still within the guidelines that have been set b y  the cer.̂ <=-r
The breakdown for each fund is provided in Fiaure 3.1.
3 0 0
200 -
100 -
B  Guided Fund 
0  Directed Fund 
Q  Total Fund
7 4 / 7 5  7 5 / 7 6  7 6 / 7 7  7 7 / 7 8  7 8 / 7 9  7 9 / 8 0  8 0 / 8  1 8 1  8 2  8 2  8 3  8 3  8 '
Figure 3.1. Provincial Subsidy Funding, 1973/74-19S3/ 3 4 .
Source : Complied from Department of Interior, 1934, 
op.cit., pp. 8-22.
3.5. Central Supervision
Central Supervision over the implementation of the 
program is imposed by setting standard provisions in terms of 
work priorities, limitations, administrative procedures and 
work quality. These are laid out in the Ministerial
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Instruction repeated each year. in this instruction, in is 
clearly stipulated that:
(1). funding should be allocated foe highly 
prioritized development projects in communication, 
production infrastructure, social and economic 
sectors stated in the recent Provincial Five-Year 
Development Plan to
(2) . open isolated areas and provide enhanced 
employment prospects in the regions concerned by 
making use of local manpower and materials and use as 
few imported commodities as possible, which is turn 
will
(3). increase the level of citizen participation in 
development activities by tendering projects to local 
private firms, and not simply by (unpaid) cooperative 
work, and can be completed in one financial year and 
should
(4). support other projects within the region in the 
national development program.^®
In addition, each year the provisions also specify the 
kinds of projects that are highly encouraged, such as road 
construction, road improvement and maintenance, irrigation 
networks, reservoir floodgates, flood prevention, terracing 
for rice cultivation, drainage, village infrastructure 
improvement and the like. Projects prohibited are: land
development, such as office buildings, houses, luxury swimming 
pools as well as the purchase of luxurious cars for individual 
officials. In somewhat greater detail, the provisions also 
state that the local government should not provide working 
capital either for the local governments'
See Department of Interior, 1984, op.cit., pp. 1
18 .
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enterprises or for other parties in the community.
In additional notes to the provisions, the Secretary of 
Interior also maintains that the execution of the projects may 
not depend on other projects launched under different 
programs, while the staff and technical experts available 
within the regions must be capable of planning, supervising, 
and completing the projects in a timely manner.
Pivotal to the success of the program is coordination and 
the administrative procedure for evaluating the implementation 
of the program. As the sole power in the province, the 
Governors are authorized to coordinate various central plans 
with projects carried out through the Provincial Subsidy 
Scheme. But on a day to day basis, the coordination is 
administered by the Provincial Development Planning Boards.
Further, in devising the administrative procedures, 
attention was also given to the problems of evaluation and 
corruption.^' Although the program is initiated and
In his notes on the Kabupaten Program, another 
scheme launched under the Presidential Decree Program, Y.B, 
de wit quotes two widespread but unchecked opinions current 
in Indonesia, that decentralization tends to foster 
corruption, and that it can and should be controlled by 
intricate and extensive administrative procedures. For de 
Wit, however, both assumptions are questionable. But, he 
maintains that under Indonesian circumstances, minimizing 
corruption should be put forward as a separate basic 
principle of any program. See Y.B. de Wit, "The Kabupaten 
Program, in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol. 
I X . ,  No. 1 {Canberra: March 1973), p. 73.
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financed by the central government, it is realized that, to 
get the program going smoothly all functions, whether in 
preparation and execution, supervision and control, should be 
decentralization as far as possible. On the other hand, 
decentralization, to be effective, requires clear instructions 
and responsive guidances coupled with attentive overall 
supervision and inspection. Since decentralization might lead 
to unmanageable diversity, it was decided that certain basic 
procedures have to be uniform. This has resulted in the 
project forms (Daftar Usulan Rencana Proyek) and a set of 
simple planning and reporting forms. To prevent cumbersome 
administrative red tape which is made possible by the 
acceptance of the principle of decentralization combined with 
the bureaucratic spirit, it was therefore stated explicitly 
that procedures should be simple, while the administrative 
work is kept to a minimum.
Further, the project leader and the project treasurer 
must sent monthly reports to the Governor, and the Governor in 
turn reports to the Department of Interior on a quarterly 
basis. To deliberately attack corruption, the provisions also 
state that payments are made as work progresses by the 
Treasury Bureau within the Executive Secretariat, not by the 
Treasuries Section in the executing agencies. The Treasurer 
must present the contractors's accounts and reports of 
physical progress certified as correct by authorized 
provincial technical staff to the Treasury Bureau. The
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contractors then are paid by check. In addition to the normal
salary, provision was also made for payments to those taking 
part in the administration of the program. The purpose is to 
reduce illegal payments made by the contractors to those 
officials responsible for the projects.
3.6. Community Participation
Because one of the primary objectives of the Provincial 
Subsidy Scheme is to strengthen local planning and executing 
agencies, the strengths and weaknesses of these agencies are 
central to the success of the program. Since the program's 
inception, there have been fundamental changes in the status 
and the capacities of these institutions, while mechanisms to 
institute rational planning at the local levels in order to 
widen the scope of community participation have also been 
developed.
The first step in generating greater popular 
participation in governmental decision making by the central 
government was the introduction of the 'bottom up' planning 
mechanism. This was followed by the establishment of village 
councils (LKMD), which were to be umbrella organizations for 
all development activities in the community. These include, 
for example, women's groups, family planning groups, water 
user associations and the like.^ The purpose of the LKMD
USAID, Project Paper: Indonesia - Provincial
Area Development Program II, (Washington, D.C.: 1983), 
p. 24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
is to coordinate and support development programs, and it 
functions as the forum in which local planning officials meet 
with rural people where they can express their desires and 
assessment of local needs to the local government planners and 
implementers. Through this forum, it is hoped that the 
communication linkages between local governments and the 
communities they serve will be developed, while the passive 
recipient's roles previously allotted to the community will be 
improved.
The spirit of village council as a development approach 
is the granting of power in planning and managing development 
from the provincial government to local (Kabupaten)
government. It is thought to strengthen the capabilities of 
local government, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
STRENGTHENING THE CAPABILITIES OF LOCAL AGENCIES 
ISSUES AND STRATEGIES
Introduction
Although tt^ Provincial Subsidy Scheme is a national
program, its long range objective is to strengthen the 
capabilities of local agencies in planning and managing 
locally designed development projects. Central to this 
strategy is the need to encourage the devolution of authority 
and responsibility from central to lower levels of government 
and to develop communication linkages between local 
governments and the rural communities they serve to ensure 
that localized needs and aspirations are addressed.
This policy is based on the belief that until local 
governments have established the basic capacity to plan and 
manage development programs, the central government is 
unlikely to delegate significant authority to and vest 
substantial financial resources in local governments, and 
as long as the capacity of local governments is limited, it 
is unlikely that they can develop effective linkages with 
the communities within their jurisdictions.^ in detail, 
the major themes underlying the decision to delegate the 
implementation of the program to local governments are:
USAID, "Project Paper: Indonesia-Provincial 
Area Development Program II, Ibid., p. 3.
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(1), Lower levels of government are more likely to be 
sensitive to local conditions and responsive to local 
needs, and thus, more effective;
(2). Local control over development projects, moreover, 
will more likely encourage local support for project 
activities and responsibility for the continued 
maintenance and use of project resources;
(3). The sustainability of project benefits is enhanced 
if local control over development process is encouraged;
(4). Efficiency is another reason for devolving 
responsibilities to lower levels of government, because 
such agencies are more likely to respond quickly and 
appropriately to the needs of a locality;
(5). Finally, strengthened local capability to plan, 
implement, and manage development projects is often 
viewed ravourably on ideological grounds. In order 
words, it is inherently desirable to increase the 
participation and effective control by local agencies in 
place of central intervention in local affairs.^
As such, the Provincial Subsidy Scheme is attempting to 
establish a process of economic and institutional development 
rather than being a conventional project with narrowly defined 
outputs and a limited time horizon.
Therefore, the program involves both developing field 
administrative structures on an area basis, in which 
horizontal links between different offices are at least as 
important as the vertical lines of authority linking local 
agencies with central departments, and also decentralizing 
authority over planning and implementing development programs 
to local decision making bodies.
43 Michael Morfit, op.cit., p. 50.
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4.2. Major Changes
In order to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness, 
the government of Indonesia has made several important 
changes. One such change in the Department of Interior was 
the elevation of the former Directorate of Regional 
Development to the level of Directorate General of Regional 
Development. This change represents a significant step in the 
move to focus the attention of the government on the 
importance of the active participation of local level agencies 
in development activities. As a Directorate General, this 
agency has access to larger and a more skilled staff, 
additional budget resources, and a more influential position 
in the government.
Another crucial change was the recognition of the 
importance of coordination, which was so neglected in the 
past. This issue was raised by the current belief that the 
success of the program would heavily be affected by two major 
factors at the national level of policy formation and program 
planning. Decision makers must compare multi-sector 
programs with two other more traditional approaches to 
development: the single activity project and the nation-wide 
sectoral programs. One issue is the extent to which the 
central government macro planners should become directly 
involved in coordination of multi-activity programs rather
USAID, Project Paper: Indonesia-Provincial Area 
Development Program II, op.cit., p. 3.
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than be concerned with allocation of budgets among sectors and
1st the local technical departments and planning institutions 
undertake whatever amount of interagency coordination they 
think is called for. The second issue is the extent to which 
development is promoted through policies and programs of 
nation-wide coverage rather than programs that deal with 
location specific problems and potentials.
These conflicting ideas were resolved by combining the 
two arguments into one policy package. Studies undertaken so 
far show that lack of coordination has resulted in wasteful 
use of resources. Examples that have been encountered 
include: irrigation projects planned and implemented without 
consideration of local agronomic, marketing, or social 
characteristics. These projects have resulted in primary and 
secondary canals being built ten or more years ago which still 
do not irrigate land today; agricultural production programs 
in areas with no transportation links to markets have brought 
about local market gluts and farmers eventually reducing 
production to self-sufficiency levels; and irrigation projects 
in areas with no marketing roads or marketing system, etc.*^ 
Confronted with these facts, the government of Indonesia 
decided that inter-agency coordination at the national level
USAID-Indonesia: Office of Rural Development, The 
Luwu Area Development Program: A Coordinated Multi Sector 
Area Development Effort in Indonesia. (Jakarta; January 
1976), pp. 18-19.
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should be preserved to provide close horizontal communica-ion 
between the staff of numerous agencies in planning, 
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Conditions in 
which the center acted merely as the provider of funding 
without being able to intervene in the program was rejected. 
On the other hand, the freedom of regional governments to 
overcome their specific problems is also guaranteed by 
providing a broader scope of local initiatives in utilizing 
the directed funds. This combination of central involvement 
and regional autonomy has resulted in a unique type of 
decentralization of programs conducted so far.
4.3. Types of Decentralization
In Western parlance, decentralization has always referred 
to a transfer of planning, decision-making or management 
functions from the central government and its agencies to 
field organizations, subordinate units of government and semi- 
autonomous public corporations.46 In its implementation, it 
can be distinguished by the degree of authority and power, or 
the scope of functions which the government transfers to or 
shares with organizations within its jurisdiction: 
déconcentration; delegation; devolution ; and transfer to non-
46 Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabir 
Cheema, 1987, op.cit., p. 11.
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4 ?government institutions/^ Each of the terms has its own 
meaning, and they can be implemented simultaneously or at 
different times. Some developing countries began with one 
approach and later shifted to another after assessing the 
initial results. Other governments have used various 
combinations of the four, while a number of countries have 
delegated development management responsibilities to local 
governments but have maintained strong indirect controls over 
them.
Given its nature, none of the terms fits the Provincial 
Subsidy Scheme. Specifically, déconcentration can be defined 
as the handing over of some amount of administrative, 
authority and responsibility for interpreting policy to lower 
levels within central government ministries and agencies, 
while the implementation of the Provincial Subsidy Scheme is 
handed over to purely local agencies, not to vertical agencies 
stationed in the regions.
Delegation and devolution imply the transfer of sovereign 
authority for specified functions and duties to local units, 
which guarantees these institutions broad discretion in 
carrying out the explicitly granted functions. Under both 
programs, local units are autonomous and independent, and 
their legal status makes them separate or distinct from the
Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Implementing
Decentralization Programmes in Asia: A Comparative
Analysis." Public Administration and Development. Vol 
(London: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), pp. 188-189.
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govsmnient. As a conssqusncG, central antliority 
frequently exercises only indirect—supervisory control over 
such units.
In Indonesia, this is not the case. Specifically, this 
decentralized program does not create separate and distinct 
local governments, which can embark on any project at their 
own discretion. The central authority still exercises direct 
control over the program, by promulgating central directives 
and prohibitions. Therefore, this type of decentralized 
program can be defined as 'medebewind,' a Dutch generic term 
meaning 'cooperation'. The program is administered by the 
local agencies, but under strict control of the central 
authority. Consequently, strengthening the capability of 
local institutions refers primarily to implementation aspects 
of the program, rather then to overall aspects, such as 
planning and controlling. The basis for such a policy is the 
belief that project planning in its broader scope is very 
complex and the most difficult one.
4.4. Strengthening the Capacities of Local Governments
Because of the highly centralized character of the 
present pattern of governance, strengthening the capacities of 
local government has always referred to the provincial 
government. Decentralization of authority, then, has 
frequently been taken to mean giving greater scope for the 
exercise of judgement at the provincial level of how to
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implement government p o l i c y . T h e  executing agencies that
are being strengthened are both planning agencies and local 
technical departments within the office of the Governor, cn 
the grounds that it is located at the pivotal intersection 
between 'bottom up' and 'top down' flows of authority and 
administrative activity. Besides, the current local 
government law also stipulates that the Governor has broad 
administrative oversight and responsibilities over development 
activities undertaken in his region. The Ministerial Decree 
regarding the Provincial Subsidy Scheme further strengthens 
the Governor's role by making him responsible for supervising 
the development of the Five-Year Plan, and making him the key 
figure in the determination of projects to be included in the 
annual development plan as the sole authority in the region.
In another context, the office of the Governor can also 
play a crucial role in communicating local needs to the 
central government. It seems entirely appropriate, however, 
that the provincial planners should play a more active role in 
analyzing local demands and problems, in searching for 
complimentarities between local initiatives and national 
programs, and identifying key targets of opportunity for 
national programs within the province.
In addition, the provincial planners can make an 
important contribution to national development efforts by 
evaluating, in a constructive fashion, national efforts within
48 See Michael Morfit, op.cit., p. 51.
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ths pirovinc© in tsnrns of thoiir impact on th© locsl nopul3.0.1 do 
and their responsiveness to local needs. This information can 
provide feedback to national development.
Therefore, the provincial planners represent the first 
link in a chain which can tie national programs (top-down) to 
local efforts (bottom-up). This crucial position can further 
be strengthened by vesting more authority in this agency by 
devising integrated planning, in which spatial, programmatic, 
financial, budgetary and investment aspects are woven into a 
comprehensive process. The most appropriate long-term goal of 
institution building at the provincial level should include:
- mobilization of financial resources;
- determination of broad policies;
- allocation of resources;
- planning of specific projects;
- implementation of projects;
- overseeing/co-ordinating/monitoring implementation 
of projects.
To undertake realistically and successfully a job of this 
magnitude, the provincial government should have more than the 
tools, i.e., the authorities and responsibilities.
This office must also have the wherewithal to use those tools, 
i.e., the staff capacity. To sum up, the political 
commitment of the national government to vest more power in 
local authorities, the ability and willingness of the national 
bureaucracy to facilitate and support decentralized 
development programs, and the capacity of field officials of 
national departments to coordinate their activities at the 
provincial level will strongly influence the success of the
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program.
Overall, after thoroughly review the progress of the 
Provincial Subsidy Scheme and look the past achievement it 
will be some policy recommendations for future prospects 
discuss in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. Conclusion
The preceding review of the current decentralization 
program in Indonesia revealed the limited nature of provincial 
authorities to conduct their overall functions.
Neither the superior management of the provincial 
administration nor their access to external support appear to 
have been utilized to encourage a more systematic or effective 
use of delegated funds to respond to demands from the 
community grass roots levels. It is appropriate that the 
provincial authority be encouraged to take a much more 
positive role in shaping more integrated responses to locally 
perceived needs.
5.2. Policy Recommendations
In the near future, the provincial administrations can 
anticipate an increasing role in coordinating local and 
national development activities. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to assure that the provincial governments are 
provided with an adequately organized body of information on 
public investment in their jurisdictions. It is also 
essential that they experiment with new management devices to 
increase their influence over technical staff of the line 
ministries to ensure better coordination and eventual
84
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integration of their activities. To support this goal, the 
role of provincial governments in integrating top-down and 
bottom-up planning should be strengthened. In addition, there 
are various roles which are essential to 'comprehensive 
regional planning' that should be assumed by the provincial 
governments. These include:
(a) establishment of a data and information management 
center;
(b) conflict resolution among contradictory provincial 
plan elements;
(c) selective regional issue and problem analysis;
(d) provision, either directly or as a broker, of a 
pool of technical resources for assisting provincial 
planning;
(e) preparation of standardized components for local 
projects design activities, i.e., standard cost- 
benefit pro forma;
(f) facilitation of interagency and intergovernmental 
coordination information transfer and guidelines; and
(g) selected training activities.
Finally, the willingness and ability of the central 
authority to relax its tight control over the implementation 
of the program, and the willingness of the government to widen 
the scope of local initiatives will be critical to the future 
success of the program.
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